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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Interface Group-Nevada, Inc. appeals from an order of the 
United States District Court for the District of Delaware 
entered in connection with the Chapter 11 proceeding of 
Trans World Airlines, Inc. ("TWA") which rejected Interface's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
* Hon. Phyllis A. Kravitch, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the 
Eleventh Circuit, sitting by designation. 
 
                                2 
  
claim for interest on its administrative claims, rejected its 
claim for liquidated damages, and rejected some of the 
elements in its calculation of its actual damages. TWA 
cross-appeals from the failure to dismiss Interface's 





The material facts underlying this appeal are not in 
dispute. Interface, which is in the business of, among other 
things, arranging and packaging vacation tours, purchased 
two 1973 Lockheed L-1011s in 1988 from the 
Manufacturer's Hanover Trust Company, which had been 
leasing the planes to TWA. Interface paid a total of 
$25,200,000 for the two planes, financing 100% of the 
purchase price. By agreement dated March 22, 1988, 
Interface then leased the planes to TWA. These two planes 
lie at the center of this dispute. 
 
Though TWA initially met its obligations under the lease, 
it ceased paying rent on the two L-1011s sometime in late 
1990 or early 1991. Interface brought suit and obtained an 
order of attachment for the planes from a California state 
court. Thereafter, negotiations between TWA and Interface 
resumed and culminated in the execution of a new lease 
dated May 1, 1991. Many of the terms of the 1991 lease 
("the lease") remained unchanged from the prior terms. 
Some changes were made, however, including a reduction 
in the monthly rent from $175,000 to $160,000 per plane 
and an extension of the lease term to January 31, 1996. 
The new lease also added a provision entitling Interface to 
withhold as a form of security deposit approximately 
$1,478,000 that it owed to TWA for work that TWA had 
performed on other Interface aircraft until TWA completed 
a major maintenance overhaul (known as an "OP-16") on 
the two L-1011s. In addition, the lease contained a 
stipulation from TWA that the liquidated damages provision 
contained in the original lease was valid, reasonable and 
enforceable. 
 
On January 31, 1992, TWA voluntarily filed for protection 
in bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the United States 
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Bankruptcy Code. Two months later, it defaulted on the 
lease payments to Interface due April 1, 1992. Within days, 
TWA moved for, and the bankruptcy court signed, an order 
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. S 1110 ("the S 1110 agreement") 
dated April 3, 1992 and effective March 31, 1992, 
authorizing TWA to make whatever payments were 
necessary to cure its past default and to continue to meet 
its obligations coming due under the lease on or after 
March 31, 1992. In addition, the order made clear that 
TWA was not assuming the lease pursuant to section 365 
of the Bankruptcy Code, but was retaining its right to 
petition the court for an order authorizing either the 
assumption or rejection of the lease in the future. 
 
Pursuant to the S 1110 agreement, TWA cured its default 
and continued to make all payments through September 1, 
1992, covering the month ending September 30, 1992. TWA 
made no payments after that, however, and went into 
default. It then took the aircraft out of service as of October 
24, 1992, but continued to use the Interface engines on 
other planes in its fleet. On November 12, 1992, the 
bankruptcy court granted TWA's motion to reject the lease. 
Nevertheless, TWA did not make the aircraft available to 
Interface until December 3, 1992. At that time, Interface 
requested TWA to keep the two planes until after the 
Christmas holiday, and took actual physical possession of 
the aircraft on December 29 and 30, 1992. 
 
TWA concedes that the planes were returned in worse 
mechanical condition than required under the lease. After 
repossessing the aircraft, Interface attempted to mitigate its 
damages by either selling or leasing the planes, but there 
had been a precipitous downturn in the airline industry, 
and its efforts were unavailing. As a result, Interface was 
forced to place the two L-1011s in long-term or "deep" 
storage in Arizona. 
 
On November 13, 1992, the day after TWA rejected the 
lease, Interface filed a claim for administrative expenses 
incurred as a result of TWA's breach of the S 1110 
agreement and its rejection of the lease. Interface amended 
its claim on September 23, 1993. 
 
At the hearing in the bankruptcy court on Interface's 
Motion for Immediate Payment of Administrative Rent, 
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Interface argued that it was entitled to the liquidated 
damages provided for in the lease as a result of TWA's 
breach. Interface contended that in the alternative it was 
entitled to recover its actual damages for the loss of rent, 
the return condition maintenance work not performed, and 
the costs associated with its storage of the planes and 
attempts to re-market them. All of these were sought as 
administrative expenses. 
 
In opposition, TWA first argued that Interface's 
unsecured claim should be dismissed for Interface's failure 
to file a proper proof of claim. After the bankruptcy court 
rejected that argument, TWA contended, inter alia, that (1) 
the liquidated damages provision was void as contrary to 
public policy, (2) Interface's administrative claim should be 
limited to lost rent for the period from October 1, 1992 to 
October 24, 1992, the date that TWA allegedly took the 
planes out of service, (3) Interface failed to mitigate its 
damages, and (4) Interface's loss as a result of the condition 
of the aircraft on return should be offset by the $1,478,000 
security deposit it was holding for the OP-16 overhauls 
TWA had been obliged to perform at a future date. 
 
In a brief oral opinion, the bankruptcy court concluded 
that (1) the liquidated damages provision was penal rather 
than compensatory and, therefore, was unenforceable, (2) 
Interface's attempt to mitigate its damages was sufficient, 
(3) the planes, or at least their engines, were being used by 
and were of value to TWA through December 3, 1992, (4) 
Interface was entitled to administrative status on the rents 
owing from October 1, 1992 through December 10, 1992, 
(5) damages resulting from the return condition 
maintenance deficiencies and from rents accruing after 
December 10, 1993 were recoverable only as unsecured 
claims, (6) the monthly rent recoverable would be $133,000 
per plane as opposed to the $160,000 provided for in the 
lease, (7) Interface was entitled to damages resulting from 
TWA's maintenance deficiencies in the amount of 
$1,175,149, and (8) the amount of Interface's unsecured 
claim would be offset by the $1,478,000 "reserve 
maintenance deposit" held by Interface. 
 
The parties then submitted an order embodying the 
bankruptcy court's rulings. The order, "approved as to 
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form" by counsel for Interface, granted Interface an 
unsecured claim of $9,453,231 and an administrative claim 
of $617,918, representing $133,000 per month per plane 
from October 1, 1992 -- the date of the breach-- through 
December 10, 1992. In addition, the order provided that 
"Interface's Motion for Payment of Administrative Rent is, 
except as resolved by the foregoing provisions of the Order, 
hereby denied." App. at 581. The order was signed by the 
bankruptcy court on September 8, 1994. 
 
When the order was appealed to the district court, that 
court first referred the matter to a magistrate judge, who 
prepared a report and recommendation. Both parties filed 
objections thereto in the district court. In a thorough 
opinion, the district court reviewed the magistrate judge's 
report and recommendation de novo and made the following 
ten findings: (1) the bankruptcy court did not abuse its 
discretion in permitting Interface to pursue a general 
unsecured claim; (2) the proper time period for Interface's 
administrative claim was from the date of the breach 
through the date on which TWA made the planes available 
to Interface or, in other words, October 1, 1992 through 
December 3, 1992; (3) the bankruptcy court erred in 
denying administrative expense status to the damages 
flowing from TWA's failure to meet the return maintenance 
conditions; (4) Interface's claim for unjust enrichment 
concerning the maintenance conditions was meritless; (5) 
the liquidated damages provision of the lease was 
unenforceable; (6) the bankruptcy court did not err in 
reducing the stream of future rents to their present value; 
(7) Interface's request for interest on its administrative 
claim was not properly presented to the bankruptcy court 
or to the district court on appeal and, therefore, was 
waived; (8) Interface's claim for "super-priority" 
administrative treatment under 11 U.S.C. S 507(b) was 
likewise waived; (9) Interface was entitled to an unsecured, 
prepetition claim for its costs associated with storing the 
aircraft after repossessing them; and (10) the bankruptcy 
court erred in setting off the $1,478,000 OP-16 security 
deposit against Interface's unsecured claim because TWA 
had not performed an OP-16 overhaul on either plane. 
 
On appeal, Interface contends that (1) the district court 
erred in holding its claim for interest was waived, (2) the 
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lease's liquidated damages provision is enforceable because 
it does not exact a penalty, and (3) the bankruptcy court's 
award of actual damages was clearly erroneous because the 
bankruptcy court (a) improperly reduced the amount of the 
administrative monthly rent from $160,000 as provided in 
lease to $133,000 and (b) improperly awarded Interface 
$189,000 for only one "C" maintenance check while TWA 
had failed to perform a "C" check on either plane in breach 
of its obligations under the lease. 
 
In its cross-appeal, TWA argues that (1) Interface's entire 
unsecured claim should have been disallowed on account of 
its failure to file a proper proof of claim, (2) the district 
court erred in holding that the damages resulting from 
TWA's failure to meet the return maintenance conditions 
constituted an administrative expense, and (3) the district 
court erred in refusing to permit TWA to offset the 
$1,478,000 "maintenance deposit" against Interface's 





Because the district court sat as an appellate court 
reviewing an order of the bankruptcy court, our review of 
its determinations is plenary. In re Continental Airlines, 125 
F.3d 120, 128 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1049 
(1998). "In reviewing the bankruptcy court's 
determinations, we exercise the same standard of review as 
the district court," Fellheimer, Eichen & Braverman, P.C. v. 
Charter Technologies, Inc., 57 F.3d 1215, 1223 (3d Cir. 
1995), that is, we review the bankruptcy court's legal 
determinations de novo, its factual findings for clear error 
and its exercise of discretion for abuse thereof. In re Engle, 
124 F.3d 567, 571 (3d Cir. 1997) . We have jurisdiction 




We consider first whether the district court erred in 
refusing to address Interface's request for interest on the 
administrative portion of its claim. In declining to do so, the 
district court stated that the bankruptcy court had not 
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addressed the issue, Interface had never explicitly 
requested a ruling from the bankruptcy court, and Interface 
"approved as to form" the bankruptcy court's order, which 
did not include an award of interest. In addition, the 
district court noted that, on appeal to it, Interface had not 
listed the issue of its entitlement to interest on its 
administrative claim in its Statement of Issues on Appeal 
and had raised the issue only in the conclusion to its brief 
in the district court. Thus, the court concluded that 
Interface had waived the issue before both courts. In the 
course of reaching this conclusion, the court highlighted 
the novelty and complexity of the issue and recognized that 
the various courts that have addressed it have taken 
differing approaches and have reached different 
conclusions. Noting also that the bankruptcy court had not 
had the opportunity to apply its unique expertise in 
deciding the issue, the district court declined to exercise its 
discretion to address such a claim. 
 
In order to put the issue of waiver in perspective, it is 
necessary to review briefly the issue found to be waived. 
Both the bankruptcy court and the district court had 
granted Interface administrative status on the rents owing 
from October 1, 1992 through early December, 1992, with 
the district court reducing the end of the period from 
December 10 to December 3. The district court, unlike the 
bankruptcy court, held Interface was also entitled to an 
administrative claim for its damages for TWA's failure to 
return the planes in the condition specified in the leases. 
These two figures constitute the administrative claim on 
which Interface contends it was entitled to interest. 
 
Entitlement to interest on an administrative claim is an 
issue that this court has never addressed. As the district 
court recognized, the question whether to award interest on 
an administrative trade debt is an issue of considerable 
complexity that has engendered a wide array of approaches 
and conclusions in the courts. The Bankruptcy Code does 
not expressly address the issue. As a result, courts have 
attempted to resolve the issue by turning to pre-Code case 
law, analogizing to the treatment of awards of interest on 
tax claims and balancing the interests that animate much 
of the Code -- namely, the necessity of encouraging 
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creditors to continue dealing with bankrupt debtors and the 
often antagonistic concern not to deplete the estate through 
excessive awards of high priority administrative claims. As 
one of our sister circuits has stated "the diversity of 
approaches indicates the complexity of the issue." In re 
Colortex Indus., 19 F.3d 1371, 1377 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(concluding that interest is recoverable on administrative 
trade debts). But see In re United Trucking Serv., Inc., 851 
F.2d 159, 164-65 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting division among the 
courts and concluding that the allowance of interest is 
usually not appropriate). 
 
In this context we examine whether Interface fairly placed 
the novel and complex claim of its entitlement to interest on 
its administrative claim before the bankruptcy court and 
the district court. Interface contends that it preserved its 
claim for interest in the bankruptcy court both in its proof 
of claim and in the proposed pretrial order. In its amended 
proof of claim, Interface listed the administrative claim it 
was seeking as "$22,517,867.00 (+ interest) [At least]." App. 
at 72 (brackets in original) (emphasis added). Elsewhere in 
its amended proof of claim, Interface again stated that it 
was seeking an administrative claim in the amount of 
"$22,517,867.00 (plus interest)" (emphasis added). There 
was no reference to interest other than the two underlined 
above. The proposed joint pretrial order states merely that 
"Interface seeks interest and legal fees, as provided in the 
Lease and by law." App. at 34. Interface contends that it 
had no further opportunity to press its demand before the 
bankruptcy court. 
 
We have substantial question whether these slight 
references really were sufficient to give the bankruptcy 
court notice that Interface was seeking an award of interest 
on the administrative claim. However, the bankruptcy court 
itself, when reading from the proof of claim, noted at the 
hearing that Interface claimed "$22,517,867, plus interest." 
App. at 403. Although we believe the district court may 
have reasonably concluded Interface did not give the 
requisite notice of its claim to the bankruptcy court, in light 
of Interface's reference to interest in both its proof of claim 
and the joint pretrial order, and the bankruptcy court's 
reference to the claim for interest, we prefer to rest our 
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holding on a different ground, i.e., Interface's failure to 
preserve the issue in the district court. 
 
Bankruptcy Rule 8006 requires a party appealing to the 
district court to file a "statement of issues to be presented" 
on appeal within ten days of the bankruptcy court order. 
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8006. Interface timely filed such a 
statement and listed ten separate issues. Not one of those 
issues contended that the bankruptcy court erred in failing 
to award interest on the administrative claim. 
 
Interface argues that the sixth issue listed, which asks 
"[d]id the Bankruptcy Court err in limiting Interface's 
administrative claim to only $617,918," is broad enough to 
encompass its claim for interest. We do not agree. The issue 
of the amount of the administrative claim and the issue of 
whether interest is awardable on that claim are 
conceptually distinct issues implicating very different 
factual and legal analyses. 
 
In addition to Rule 8006, Bankruptcy Rule 8010 is also 
designed to assure that the district court is fully advised as 
to the contentions of the party on appeal from the 
bankruptcy court. Rule 8010 requires that all appellate 
briefs filed in the district court contain a statement of the 
issues presented, and requires that the argument section of 
the appellant's brief "shall contain the contentions of the 
appellant . . . ." Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8010(a)(1)(C),(E). 
 
This rule was modeled after Rule 28 of the Federal Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, see Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8010, 
advisory committee notes, and, like Rule 28, "is not only a 
technical or aesthetic provision, but also has a substantive 
function--that of providing the other parties and the court 
with some indication of which flaws in the appealed order 
or decision motivate the appeal." In the Matter of Gulph 
Woods Corp., 189 B.R. 320, 323 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (looking to 
cases interpreting Rule 28 for guidance in interpreting Rule 
8010). See also In re Suncoast Airlines, Inc., 188 B.R. 56, 
58 n.2 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (same). Thus, a district court may, 
in its discretion, deem an argument waived if it is not 
presented in accordance with Rule 8010. See In re Brown 
Family Farms, Inc., 872 F.2d 139, 142 (6th Cir. 1989). We 
therefore review the district court's determination for abuse 
of discretion. Id. 
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As the district court correctly stated, Interface did not 
mention the issue of the appropriateness of an award of 
interest until the conclusion of its 40 page brief. The 
conclusion read, in its entirety: "For the reasons stated 
above, it is respectfully requested that Interface's claim be 
allowed, as summarized in Schedule A, along with 
attorneys' fees and interest." A footnote to the conclusion 
then provided simply that "[i]nterest on administrative trade 
debt is allowable as an administrative claim. In re Colortex 
Indus., 19 F.3d 1371 (11th Cir. 1994)." Finally, the 
schedule referenced in the conclusion stated in a footnote 
that "[t]o the extent deemed administrative, all amounts 
should bear interest (See `Conclusion')." 
 
In clear disregard of the mandate of Rule 8010, Interface 
did not set forth the issue in a statement of issues 
presented and did not reference this issue anywhere in the 
argument section of its brief. Moreover, the scant references 
to the issue that were made in the brief failed to specify 
whether the bankruptcy court had awarded interest or had 
discussed the issue to any extent. Indeed, the references in 
the conclusion do not even suggest whether Interface was 
asking the district court to affirm or reverse. 
 
In light of this record, it is not surprising that the 
magistrate judge, to whom the case was referred, failed to 
make any reference to interest in her Report and 
Recommendation to the district court. Thus, we cannot say 
that when Interface raised this issue in its objections to 
that Report, the district court abused its discretion in 
holding that Interface had waived its request for interest on 
its administrative claim. 
 
When the district courts are sitting on appeal, they are 
entitled to the same full exposition of the parties' 
contentions that we have repeatedly insisted on for 
ourselves. See Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 178 (3d 
Cir. 1997) ("an argument consisting of no more than a 
conclusory assertion . . . will be deemed waived"); 
(Southwestern Pa. Growth Alliance v. Browner, 121 F.3d 
106, 122 (3d Cir. 1997) ("appellate courts generally should 
not address legal issues that the parties have not developed 
through proper briefing"); Commonwealth of Pa. v. HHS, 
101 F.3d 939, 945 (3d Cir. 1996) (arguments mentioned in 
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passing but not squarely argued will be deemed waived)). 
See also United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1064 n.4 (3d 
Cir.) ("The failure to raise a theory as an issue on appeal 
constitutes waiver . . . [and] briefs must contain statements 
of all issues presented for appeal, together with supporting 
arguments. . .." (emphasis in original) (internal citations 
omitted), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 623 (1996); Nagle v. 
Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 143 (3d Cir. 1993) ("When an issue is 
either not set forth in the statement of issues presented or 
not pursued in the argument section of the brief, the 
appellant has abandoned and waived that issue on 
appeal"); Lunderstadt v. Colafella, 885 F.2d 66, 78 (3d Cir. 
1989) (a "casual statement" cannot serve to preserve an 
issue on appeal where it is contained in neither the 
statement of issues on appeal nor the argument section of 
the brief). 
 
Interface, apparently in recognition of the force of TWA's 
waiver contention, argues that even assuming that the 
issue had not been presented below, this court should 
nevertheless reach and decide it because it is a pure legal 
issue. In light of Interface's failure to raise the issue 





Second, Interface argues that both the bankruptcy court 
and the district court erred in holding the liquidated 
damages clause in the lease to be unenforceable. The 
liquidated damages provision provides: 
 
       SECTION 17. REMEDIES. Upon the occurrence of any 
       Event of Default . . . Lessor may, at its option, declare 
       this Lease to be in default and at any time thereafter, 
       . . . Lessor may do one or more of the following with 
       respect to all or any Aircraft as Lessor . . . 
 
       (c) . . . Lessor, by written notice to Lessee specifying a 
       payment date . . . , may demand that Lessee pay to 
       Lessor, on the payment date specified in such notice, 
       as liquidated damages for loss of a bargain and not as 
       a penalty . . . , (x) an amount equal to any unpaid 
       Monthly Rent for such Aircraft due for periods prior to 
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       the Rental Payment Date specified in such notice plus 
       which ever of the following amounts Lessor, in its sole 
       discretion, shall specify in such notice . . . : (i) an 
       amount equal to the excess, if any, of the Termination 
       Value for such Aircraft, computed as of the Rental 
       Payment Date specified for payment in such notice, 
       over the aggregate fair market rental value . . . of such 
       Aircraft for the remainder of the Term for such Aircraft 
       after discounting such fair market rental value monthly 
       for the remainder of the Term . . . ; or (ii) an amount 
       equal to the excess, if any, of the Termination Value for 
       such Aircraft as of the date specified in such notice over 
       the fair market sales value . . . as of the Rental 
       Payment Date specified for payment in such notice.. . . 
 
App. at 639 (emphasis added). 
 
In addition, the lease states: 
 
       SECTION 18.2 WARRANTY AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
       OF VALIDITY OF THE LIQUIDATED DAMAGES 
       CLAUSE 17. TWA . . . herewith represents, warrants 
       and agrees that the liquidated damages clause found at 
       Section 17 of this New Lease (as was Section 17 of the 
       Old Lease) is valid, enforceable and negotiated at arms 
       length by parties of equal bargaining power, with the 
       harm difficult to estimate, and based on reasonable 
       valuations as known or possible in the future. TWA . . . 
       shall indemnify and defend Lessor, and each of its 
       successors, in the defense of Lessor's assertion of 
       Section 17. 
 
App. at 702 (emphasis added). 
 
The lease contains a choice of law provision calling for 
the application of New York law. New York's law regarding 
the enforceability of liquidated damages provisions is well- 
defined. "A liquidated damages provision has its basis in 
the principle of just compensation for loss" in the event of 
breach. Truck Rent-A-Center, Inc., 361 N.E.2d 1015, 1018 
(N.Y. 1977). As a general matter, such provisions are 
enforceable "provided that the clause is neither 
unconscionable nor contrary to public policy." Id. See also 
LeRoy v. Sayers, 635 N.Y.S.2d 217, 222-23 (App. Div. 
1995). 
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At the same time, the public policies of New York are 
"firmly set against the imposition of penalties or forfeitures 
for which there is no statutory authority." Truck Rent-A- 
Center, Inc., 316 N.E.2d at 1018. Thus, the law has 
developed that 
 
       [a] contractual provision fixing damages in the event of 
       breach will be sustained if the amount liquidated bears 
       a reasonable proportion to the probable loss and the 
       amount of actual loss is incapable or difficult of precise 
       estimation. . . . If however, the amount fixed is plainly 
       or grossly disproportionate to the probable loss, the 
       provision calls for a penalty and will not be enforced. 
 
Pyramid Centres & Co., Ltd. v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 663 
N.Y.S.2d 711, 713 (App. Div. 1997) (internal citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
 
Courts must apply this analysis from the parties' 
perspective as of the date of the contract rather than from 
the date of the breach, Truck Rent-A-Center, Inc., 361 
N.E.2d at 1019, and must resolve all doubts in favor of a 
construction that invalidates the provision as a penalty, 
Pyramid Centres & Co., 663 N.Y.S.2d at 713. 
 
Applying these standards, the bankruptcy court held that 
the liquidated damages provision did not bear a reasonable 
relationship to Interface's actual damages and was an 
unenforceable penalty. In like vein, the district court 
concluded that the liquidated damages provision of the 
lease was unenforceable on the ground that actual damages 
were easily calculable and the provision, when written, bore 
no relation to Interface's anticipated actual damages. Dist. 
Ct. Op. at 22-29. 
 
Although the language of the liquidated damages 
provision appears complex at first blush, its operation is 
straightforward and depends upon the ascertainment of two 
figures. One figure is the "termination value" of each 
aircraft, which represents the predicted value for each 
plane at specific dates in the future. This figure is 
predetermined in the lease. The other figure is the fair 
market rental value discounted to present value or the 
resale value of the aircraft at the time of the breach. The 
formula for liquidated damages set in S 17(c) is that, upon 
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breach, TWA would have to pay the predetermined 
termination value less either the fair market rental value, 
the option under S 17(c)(1), or the resale value, the option 
under S 17(c)(ii). 
 
The termination value set by the lease for each plane in 
late 1992 was $13,500,000. From that figure would be 
subtracted either the fair market rental value for the 
remainder of the lease or the resale value as of October 
1992. In late 1992, the airline industry was severely 
depressed and Interface's expert estimated the resale value 
of the planes to be $7,000,000 each and the fair market 
rental value to be $5,314,116 (39 remaining payments at a 
fair market rent of $100,000 per month). TWA's expert 
arrived at similar, though slightly higher, figures. 
 
We do not purport to explain what motivated the parties 
to arrive at this formula for liquidated damages. As is 
evident from the calculations above, they simply have no 
bearing on Interface's probable loss in the event of breach. 
Interface has never explained to this court, and certainly 
not to the satisfaction of either the bankruptcy or district 
court, why actual damages could not be ascertained upon 
breach. Indeed, to approximate Interface's probable loss, 
the parties needed only to total the remaining rental 
payments plus the consequential or incidental damages 
Interface was likely to incur in mitigating its damages or 
storing the aircraft. As Interface forthrightly states, 
however, "[t]hrough S 17(c), Interface sought to protect its 
multi-million dollar aircraft investment by shifting to TWA 
the risk of a market drop in the Aircraft's value. If TWA 
defaulted during the Lease, and delivered to Interface 
severely depreciated Aircraft, TWA would be responsible for 
making up the difference." Interface Br. at 28. 
 
To illustrate the effect of the liquidated damages 
provision in S 17(c), albeit in an improbable hypothetical, if 
TWA were to breach with one month remaining on the 
lease, actual damages would be approximately one month's 
rent per plane. Under S 17(c)(ii), however, TWA would owe 
the termination value of $12,500,000 minus the resale 
value at that time. Thus, using 1992 values, TWA would 
owe $5,500,000 as liquidated damages per plane. Similarly, 
under S 17(c)(i), TWA would owe the termination value of 
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$12,500,000 minus one month's rent of approximately 
$100,000, for a total of $12,400,000 per plane. 
 
We believe that New York's public policy is intended to 
avoid precisely this type of penalty. See Truck Rent-A- 
Center, Inc., 361 N.E.2d at 1018 ("A clause which provides 
for an amount plainly disproportionate to real damage is 
not intended to provide fair compensation but to secure 
performance by the compulsion of the very disproportion. A 
promisor would be compelled, out of fear of economic 
devastation, to continue performance and his promisee, in 
the event of default, would reap a windfall well above actual 
harm sustained."); LeRoy, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 222-23 ("In 
arriving at a stipulated sum as liquidated damages, there 
must be some attempt to proportion damages to the actual 
loss."). 
 
Interface, citing S 18.2 of the lease, apparently would 
have us disregard the requirement of proportionality 
because TWA expressly agreed to the formula as valid and 
enforceable. Specifically, Interface contends that TWA was 
well represented and enjoyed equal bargaining power, that 
TWA never objected to the reasonableness of the liquidated 
damages provision or requested that it be taken out of the 
lease and that consequently, it is "unseemly" for TWA now 
to claim that the provision is unenforceable. Interface Br. at 
24. 
 
Although the district court initially expressed some 
"concern" in light of S 18.2, ultimately it found that concern 
was not enough to render an otherwise invalid provision 
enforceable. Arguing to the contrary, Interface cites several 
cases in which the courts have noted that the contracts at 
issue containing a liquidated damages provision were freely 
negotiated between parties with equal bargaining power. In 
re United Merchants, 674 F.2d 134, 144 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(applying New York law); Walter E. Heller & Co. v. American 
Flyers Airline Corp., 459 F.2d 896, 899 (2d Cir. 1972) 
(applying New York law); Rattigan v. Commodore Int'l, 739 
F. Supp. 167, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (applying New York law). 
See also Truck Rent-A-Center, Inc., 361 N.E.2d at 1019-20; 
Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Justice, 673 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 
1982) (applying New York law). In each of those cases, 
however, the fact that the parties enjoyed equal bargaining 
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power was offered simply as additional support for 
upholding a liquidated damages provision that was 
otherwise reasonable and valid. 
 
Interface does not cite any case in which a court enforced 
an otherwise invalid liquidated damages provision merely 
because it was freely negotiated by sophisticated parties. 
Contracts that are void as against public policy are 
unenforceable regardless of how freely and willingly they 
were entered into. See Restatement (Second) Contracts Ch. 
8, Intro. Note (1981) (public policy concerns "touch upon 
matters of substance related to the public welfare rather 
than aspects of the bargaining process between the 
parties."); cf. Sternaman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 62 
N.E.2d 763, 764 (N.Y. 1902) ("Parties cannot make a 
binding contract in violation of law or of public policy."). 
The mere fact that TWA warranted the enforceability of the 
provision cannot negate the underlying public policy. 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the district court's order 
holding that the liquidated damages provision contained in 




Interface next challenges the amount of two items of 




The bankruptcy court's order effective March 31, 1992, 
granting TWA's application under S 1110 effectively 
approved TWA's promise to continue to perform its 
obligations to Interface under the lease. Nonetheless, when 
the bankruptcy court included as an administrative 
expense the monthly rent TWA owed for the period of 
October 1, 1992 until early December, 1992, it reduced the 
rent of $160,000 a month provided in the lease to 
$133,000. The issue before us is whether, in the event of a 
breach of a S 1110 agreement, the amount recoverable as 
administrative rent should be the amount provided for in 
the lease (here $160,000 per month), as Interface argues, or 
the fair market rental value of the property at the time of 
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the breach, representing the objectively reasonable value to 
the estate, as TWA argues. This presents an issue offirst 
impression in this circuit, which implicates the scope of 
S 1110 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
 
To resolve the issue, we first must examine the 
relationship among four different sections of the 
Bankruptcy Code: SS 362, 365, 503 and 1110. Under 
S 362(a), once a debtor files a petition in bankruptcy, an 
automatic stay is imposed on claims against the debtor's 
property. 11 U.S.C. S 362(a). Thus, if the debtor is 
performing as lessee under an unexpired lease at the time 
it files a Chapter 11 petition, the lessor subsequently 
cannot enforce its rights under the lease against the debtor 
until the automatic stay is lifted by the court or a plan of 
reorganization is confirmed. See 11 U.S.C.S 362(c),(d). 
 
Once the petition has been filed, S 365 allows a trustee or 
debtor-in-possession, subject to court approval, to 
"assume" or "reject" an unexpired lease at any time prior to 
confirmation of the debtor's plan for reorganization. 11 
U.S.C. S 365(a),(d)(2); see Sharon Steel Corp. v. National 
Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 872 F.2d 36, 43 (3d Cir. 1989). If 
the lease is assumed, i.e., the debtor and the court having 
agreed that the continuation of the lease is in the best 
interest of the debtor's reorganization and continuation, the 
debtor is entitled to receive the benefits under the lease 
but, at the same time, is responsible for performing its 
obligations thereunder. In re Columbia Gas Sys. , 50 F.3d 
233, 238-39 & n.8 (3d Cir. 1995). Should the debtor breach 
thereafter, all future payments due under the remainder of 
the lease become administrative expenses with 
administrative priority. Id. 
 
If the lease is rejected, a creditor's claim for the stream of 
future rental payments due under the now-rejected lease is 
denied post-petition administrative status and is treated as 
an unsecured prepetition claim. Id. at 238 n.8. Where the 
debtor continued to use the leased property prior to 
rejection, it is liable for the rental payments accruing 
during the period of use, and that obligation is treated as 
a S 503 post-petition administrative expense. However, the 
amount treated as an administrative expense would not 
necessarily be the rent provided for in the lease, since 
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administrative expenses are allowable only for "the actual, 
necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate." 11 
U.S.C. S 503(b)(1)(A). Thus, it is well-settled that under 
S 503 the debtor is responsible for only the fair market 
value of the property at the time of its use.1 See generally 
In re Zagata Fabricators, Inc., 893 F.2d 624, 627 (3d Cir. 
1990); Sharon Steel Corp., 872 F.2d at 42-43. 
 
Congress has provided a somewhat different scheme for 
the airline industry. Under S 1110 of the Bankruptcy Code, 
lessors of aircraft, inter alia, may avoid the automatic stay 
and retake possession of the leased equipment unless the 
airline takes certain required steps. 
 
Section 1110 provides, in relevant part: 
 
       The right . . . of a lessor . . . of . . . aircraft . . . leased 
       to . . . a debtor that is an air carrier . . . to take 
       possession of such equipment in compliance with the 
       provisions of a . . . lease . . . is not affected by section 
       362 or 363 of this title or by any power of the court to 
       enjoin such taking of possession, unless-- 
 
        (1) before 60 days after the date of the order for relief 
       under this chapter, the trustee [or debtor-in- 
       possession], subject to the court's approval, agrees to 
       perform all obligations of the debtor that become due on 
       or after such date under such . . . lease . . . 
 
11 U.S.C. S 1110(a) (emphasis added). In addition, the 
debtor must agree to cure all prior defaults and all future 
defaults within 30 days of their occurrence. Id.  
 
As is evident, S 1110 subtly alters the interplay between 
the provisions discussed above in the context of aircraft 
and aircraft equipment financing. Section 1110 was 
designed in part to increase availability of low-interest 
capital to the transportation industry. See generally In re 
Continental Airlines, Inc., 932 F.2d 282, 291 (3d Cir. 1991). 
Toward this end, S 1110 renders S 362's automatic stay 
effective for only 60 days following the filing of the petition 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Because all relevant events underlying the instant appeal occurred 
prior to 1994, this dispute is governed by the pre-1994 Code. We, 
therefore, need not consider the 1994 amendments to SS 365 and 1110. 
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in bankruptcy. After that time, the lessor is free to 
repossess the aircraft in the event of breach by the debtor 
unless, within those 60 days, the debtor enters into what is 
referred to as a "S 1110 agreement." If a S 1110 agreement 
is executed, which requires court approval but not the 
lessor's consent, the automatic stay remains in effect. In 
return for this protection, the debtor or its trustee must 
"perform all obligations of the debtor that become due on or 
after such date [on which the S 1110 agreement is entered 
into] under such . . . lease" and cure any prior or future 
defaults. 11 U.S.C. S 1110(a). 
 
The legislative history to S 1110 provides guidance as to 
how its invocation affects the operation of the other 
sections of the Code discussed above. 
 
The House Report stated: 
 
       It should additionally be noted that under section 
       1110(a) the trustee or debtor in possession is not 
       required to assume the . . . unexpired lease under 
       section 1110; rather, if the trustee or debtor in 
       possession complies with the requirement of section 
       1110(a), the trustee or debtor in possession is entitled 
       to retain the aircraft or vessel subject to the normal 
       requirements of section 365. 
 
124 Cong. Rec. H11102-03, p. 32405-06 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 
1978). A S 1110 agreement, then, operates neither as an 
assumption nor as a rejection of the entire lease, but 
rather, obligates the debtor to perform the lease obligations 
as they come due, in return for the protection of the 
automatic stay. After the S 1110 agreement is made, the 
debtor remains free to make a formal assumption or 
rejection of the lease and, until that time or such time as 
the S 1110 agreement is breached or terminated, the 
automatic stay of S 362 remains in effect. 
 
Against the backdrop of this statutory scheme, we turn 
now to the question presented on appeal. That is, whether 
Interface's administrative claim for the rental obligations 
coming due after the S 1110 agreement was entered into 
but before the planes were returned should be fixed at the 
$160,000 monthly rent provided for in the lease or whether 
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it should be reduced to the fair market value as would a 
typical administrative claim under S 503. 
 
The statutory language itself suggests the former. Under 
the terms of S 1110, if the debtor is to retain possession of 
the aircraft and continue to reap the benefits of the 
automatic stay, it must "agree[ ] to perform all obligations. 
. . that become due. . . under such. . . lease ." 11 U.S.C. 
S 1110(a) (emphasis added). Interface argues that the 
phrase "under such . . . lease" indicates Congress's 
intention to bind the debtor to the terms of its lease, a 
reading supported by the legislative history to S 1110. 
There, Congress made clear that 
 
       [t]he sections [1110 and its companion statute 1168, 
       pertaining to railroad rolling stock] protect the interest 
       of the financer by entitling him to payments according 
       to the financing agreement terms or to his equipment. 
       They protect the estate and the reorganization process 
       by leaving the choice of which the financer will get to 
       the trustee. Thus, equipment that the trustee needs to 
       keep operating the business is beyond reach by the 
       financer if the trustee is willing to continue to pay for it 
       according to pre-bankruptcy terms. If the trustee does 
       not need the equipment, he may simply surrender it to 
       the financer. 
 
H. R. Doc. No. 95-595, at 239 (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N., 5963, 6199 (emphasis added). See also 7 L. 
King, Collier on Bankruptcy P 1110.04 p. 1110-25 (15th ed. 
Rev. 1997). In addition, Congress indicated that lessors of 
equipment subject to a S 1110 agreement are assured the 
same protection as are other lessors after a lease is 
assumed by the debtor. H. R. Doc. No. 95-595, at 240, 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6199. That is, the lessor 
is entitled to "payments under the terms of the lease." Id. 
In our view, these passages leave little doubt that under a 
S 1110 agreement, the lessor is entitled to the full rent 
provided for in the lease. 
 
The only other circuit to have addressed a somewhat 
similar issue reached a similar conclusion. In In re Airlift 
Int'l, Inc., 761 F.2d 1503, (11th Cir. 1985), the question 
presented was whether the financer, GATX Leasing Corp., 
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was entitled to receive the amounts due under the terms of 
its agreement with the debtor-lessee or the value of the 
actual use of the aircraft to the debtor. The court 
determined that, in the context of a S 1110 agreement, the 
lessor was entitled to the full amount provided for under 
the terms of the agreement. Id. at 1511 ("The amount of the 
administrative claim is determined by looking to the 
amount due under the agreement."). The court in Airlift did 
not directly address the possibility of awarding the fair 
market value. 
 
Neither the bankruptcy nor district court in this case 
held that Interface's recovery should be limited to the value 
of TWA's actual use of the aircraft, and TWA does not urge 
that position on appeal. Thus, although Interface relies on 
Airlift almost exclusively, its holding is not directly apposite. 
 
Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit's general approach to 
the issue is illuminating. That court conceived of a S 1110 
agreement as a post-petition agreement to meet prepetition 
obligations. Id. at 1509. Typically, post-petition contracts in 
the ordinary course of business may be entered into by the 
debtor without prior court approval. Therefore, in order to 
protect the estate from depletion through the enforcement 
of unnecessary or deleterious post-petition contracts, an 
administrative claim based on a post-petition contract is 
subject to the court's power under S 503 to reduce the 
amount of the claim to the reasonable value of the 
contract's benefit to the estate. Id. at 1509 n.5. Similarly, in 
the context of unexpired leases, a bankruptcy court will not 
have had the opportunity to verify that the terms of an 
unexpired lease are in fact actual and necessary expenses 
of the estate prior to the debtor's formal assumption or 
rejection. Thus, if the debtor rejects the lease, the court 
may award an administrative claim for the post-petition 
rents of less than the lease terms if it determines that those 
terms are significantly disproportionate to the market rates 
that the debtor could have obtained at the time the petition 
in bankruptcy was filed. 
 
A S 1110 agreement, however, can be entered into only 
after a court has determined that the lease obligations 
represent actual and necessary costs to the estate. 
Accordingly, having received court approval ex ante, there 
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is no need to subject the agreement to the court's review for 
a second time upon the submission of a creditor's claim. Id. 
at 1509, 1510 n.5. TWA's S 1110 agreement was reviewed 
and approved by the bankruptcy court as being "in the best 
interests of TWA, its creditors and its estate." App. at 7. 
Thus, the purpose of S 503 review by the bankruptcy court 
was fulfilled at that time, and we read SS 503 and 1110 as 
erecting no further barriers to Interface's receipt of the full 
rental amounts provided in the lease.2  
 
In determining the post-breach monthly rent to which 
Interface was entitled, the bankruptcy court reduced the 
monthly rent for the relevant period from $160,000, as 
provided for in the lease, to $133,000, which was the figure 
provided by TWA's expert as the fair market rental value of 
the aircraft in 1992. The district court did not alter that 
figure. We hold that both courts erred as a matter of law in 
not awarding Interface an administrative claim for the lease 
amount of $160,000 per month for the period of October 1, 




Interface also argues that the bankruptcy and district 
courts erred when calculating its actual damages because 
they did not include damages for TWA's failure to perform 
a timely "C" check on one of the two aircraft. Section 5(c) 
of the lease provides that 
 
       Upon the return of any Aircraft including at the end of 
       the Term with respect thereto, Lessee shall have had 
       with respect to such Aircraft, at its own expense, a "C" 
       check or its functional equivalent completed within 45 
       days prior to the return of such Aircraft. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In response to Interface's suggestion that we follow the Eleventh 
Circuit's reasoning, TWA attempts to distinguish Airlift on the ground 
that GATX had voluntarily entered into and consented to the S 1110 
agreement with the debtor whereas here, TWA entered into the 
agreement and obtained court approval to assume the obligations under 
the lease without Interface's consent. TWA's Br. at 33-35. We believe this 
is a distinction without a difference and find no reasoned justification 
for 
conditioning a creditor's entitlement to full payment on whether or not 
it consented to the formation of the S 1110 agreement. 
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App. at 662. A "C" check is a standard aircraft maintenance 
overhaul which, according to the parties' joint pretrial 
order, would have cost TWA $189,000. 
 
TWA stipulated that it performed its last "C" check for 
aircraft no. N31011 on July 17, 1992 and for aircraft no. 
N41012 on September 28, 1992. In addition, the district 
court found, and neither party disputes here, that the 
"return date," or more precisely, the date on which TWA 
made the aircraft available to Interface, was December 3, 
1992. Thus, while the lease called for "C" checks to be 
performed within 45 days of the return date, in fact they 
were performed 139 days and 66 days prior to the return of 
the aircraft. 
 
For reasons not fully explained, the bankruptcy court 
granted Interface damages for only one "C" check in the 
amount of $189,000, and the district court did not alter 
that determination. Interface argues that it is plainly 
entitled to damages for TWA's failure to perform a"C" check 
on the second plane within 45 days of its return, as 
required under the lease. In opposition, TWA contends that 
Interface waived this argument on appeal to the district 
court and that the bankruptcy court's award was not 
clearly erroneous because, according to TWA, Interface 
suffered no harm as the required "C" check was performed 
on that plane only 66 days prior to the date it was made 
available. 
 
With respect to the alleged waiver, TWA contends that in 
Interface's appeal to the district court it had argued only 
that the bankruptcy court had erred in calculating its 
actual damages, without specifically drawing attention to 
the "C" check issue. We are not persuaded by TWA's waiver 
argument. Interface's inclusion in the Statement of Issues 
on Appeal that the bankruptcy court erred in calculating its 
actual damages is broad enough to encompass the various 
instances in which Interface's damages might have been 
underestimated. Moreover, in the argument section of its 
opening brief submitted to the district court, Interface 
argued that the bankruptcy court erroneously awarded it 
only a portion of its damages flowing from TWA's failure to 
meet the return maintenance requirements contained in S 5 
of the lease. Thereafter, Interface pressed the specific issue 
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of the second "C" check in its reply memorandum, 
describing its actual damages as "including a clearly 
overdue `C' check." Although Interface could have made a 
more detailed argument, we cannot say that the issue was 
waived. 
 
TWA next argues that Interface was not harmed by its 
failure to perform the second "C" check within 45 days of 
the return date and, therefore, that TWA should not be 
required to pay damages. However, the bankruptcy court 
made no finding that Interface suffered no harm. Indeed, 
contrary to TWA's argument, its expert did not testify to 
that effect. 
 
The bankruptcy court appears to have rejected the claim 
for the second "C" check on the ground it had not come due 
by the date TWA rejected the lease. However, the lease 
required TWA to perform the "C" check within 45 days of 
the planes' return. TWA's expert agreed the "C" check was 
not performed within 45 days of the second plane's return. 
Accordingly, we must conclude that both the bankruptcy 
and district courts erred in failing to award Interface 
$189,000 for the second "C" check which was not 




To conclude, on Interface's appeal we will (1) affirm the 
district court's conclusion that Interface failed to preserve 
its claim for interest on its administrative claim, (2) affirm 
the district court's conclusion that the liquidated damages 
provision contained in the lease is unenforceable under 
New York law, (3) reverse the district court's decision, 
which had adopted the bankruptcy court's decision, to 
grant Interface's administrative claim for monthly rent in 
the amount of $133,000 per plane and direct that Interface 
be granted rent in the full lease amount of $160,000 per 
plane from October 1, 1992 through December 3, 1992, 
and (4) reverse the district court's decision, which had 
effectively adopted the bankruptcy court's decision, denying 
Interface additional damages of $189,000 for TWA's failure 
to perform a timely "C" check on the second aircraft, and 
direct that its claim be increased by that amount. We turn 
to consider the cross-appeal. 
 






TWA raises three issues in its cross-appeal. First, it 
argues that the district court erred in affirming the 
bankruptcy court's denial of TWA's motion to dismiss 
Interface's unsecured prepetition claim as untimely. 
 
Interface filed its "Amended Administrative Proof of 
Claim" on September 23, 1993, well before the bar date of 
December 3, 1993 (the last day on which unsecured claims 
could be filed). However, it had not filed an unsecured 
claim as such. At the close of Interface's case before the 
bankruptcy court, TWA moved to dismiss Interface's entire 
unsecured claim on the ground that Interface hadfiled only 
an administrative claim and that the unsecured claim had 
not been filed in time. Interface responded that its 
September 23, 1993 filing was sufficient to constitute an 
unsecured proof of claim, that TWA was on notice of 
Interface's intent to pursue an unsecured claim in the event 
that its claim or any part thereof was denied administrative 
expense status, and that TWA had been treating Interface's 
entire claim as a Class 8 unsecured claim since the claim 
had been filed. In addition, Interface cross-moved before the 
bankruptcy court for leave to amend its proof of claim if the 
court deemed it necessary. 
 
The bankruptcy court ruled as follows: 
 
        The Court is [ ]well-aware of the liberal amendment 
       rules. The sections of the Bankruptcy Code provide 
       that an administrative expense claim may be requested 
       and thus a proof of claim is not required for an 
       administrative expense request. If there is to be a claim 
       under Section 501, I believe it is, there must be a proof 
       of claim filed if, in fact, the debtor's schedules show 
       that claim as being disputed. 
 
        And what we have in Exhibit 41 [Interface's amended 
       proof of claim filed Sept. 9, 1993] is kind of a 
       bastardized claim. It indicates that it is an amended 
       administrative claim. It also checked that there's an 
       unsecured priority claim, which is questionable as to 
       what was meant by that. 
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       *  *  * 
 
        This Court has found that when an administrative 
       claim is disallowed that that portion for breach of 
       contract becomes an unsecured claim. Thus, I cannot 
       grant the motion to dismiss. 
 
App. at 402-04. The district court affirmed on the ground 
that TWA "had notice of the substance of Interface's claim 
and recognized that the claim might be treated as a 
general, unsecured obligation." Dist. Ct. Op. at 9-10. 
 
Bankruptcy Rule 7015 provides that amendments to 
claims shall be governed by Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7015, which commits the 
decision to grant or deny leave to amend to the trial court's 
sound discretion. See generally Coventry v. United States 
Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 518 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 
On appeal, TWA does not argue that it was prejudiced by 
the bankruptcy court's allowance of Interface's unsecured 
claim but rather that because no proper unsecured claim 
had been filed before the bar date, any amendment of the 
original claim or allowance of the unsecured claim would be 
improper. As the bankruptcy court found, however, 
Interface's "bastardized" proof of claim was ambiguous in 
that it mentioned both an administrative proof of claim and 
an unsecured priority claim. App. at 403. As such, we agree 
with both the bankruptcy and district courts that 
Interface's proof of claim had put TWA on notice that an 
unsecured claim had been made against it and could be 
pursued. Thus, there is nothing in the record to suggest 
that the bankruptcy court's allowance of Interface's 
unsecured claim was an abuse of discretion. Cf. In re 
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Lit., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (among the grounds justifying denial of leave to 
amend are undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, 
prejudice and futility); Hatzel & Buehler, Inc. v. Station 
Plaza Assocs., 150 B.R. 560, 562 (Bankr. D. Del. 1993) 
(amendment of a claim under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7015 
should be granted where the purpose is to cure a defect in 
the claim as originally filed, to describe the claim with 
greater particularity or to plead a new theory of recovery on 
the facts set forth in the original claim). We will affirm both 
the bankruptcy court and the district court on this issue. 
 




TWA next contends that the district court erred in 
holding that the damage flowing from TWA's failure to meet 
the return maintenance conditions provided for in the lease 
would be treated as an administrative claim, thereby 
reversing the bankruptcy court's determination that it was 
a prepetition unsecured claim. There is little precedent to 
help resolve this difficult issue. 
 
Section 5 of the lease specified in detail the condition in 
which the two L-1011 aircraft were to be returned to 
Interface. TWA concedes that it failed to meet that 
requirement. Accordingly, the only question before us is 
whether TWA's failure to meet the lease's return condition 
terms gives rise to an administrative rather than an 
unsecured claim. 
 
TWA reasons that this obligation did not come due before 
November 12, 1992, the date it rejected the lease, and thus 
its failure to meet the return conditions requirements 
should be treated as an unsecured prepetition claim. The 
bankruptcy court agreed, relying on its opinion in In re 
Continental Airlines, Inc., 146 B.R. 520 (Bankr. D. Del. 
1992), which held that once a lease is rejected, the debtor 
is no longer bound by its terms. Under In re Continental 
Airlines, return obligations arising after rejection would only 
give rise to an administrative claim if the debtor's failure to 
meet the conditions conferred an actual benefit on the 
estate. Id. at 527-28. One court of appeals has reached a 
contrary conclusion. In In re United Trucking Service, Inc., 
851 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1988), the Sixth Circuit held that 
the lessee's failure to meet return conditions benefits the 
estate in the amount that the debtor/lessee would have to 
pay to meet those conditions and, therefore, the lessor's 
claim for resulting damages should be given administrative 
priority. Id. at 162. 
 
In the case before us, the district court reversed the 
holding of the bankruptcy court on the classification of the 
return maintenance conditions. The district court noted 
that in neither In re Continental Airlines nor In re United 
Trucking Service, had the debtor formally entered into a 
S 1110 agreement. Dist. Ct. Op. at 16 n.9. That distinction 
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is critical. After TWA entered into the S 1110 agreement, the 
extent of its duty to perform its obligations under the lease 
and the ramifications of its failure to do so were controlled 
by the operation of the S 1110 agreement and by S 1110 
itself. See Airlift, 761 F.2d at 1513 ("[t]hough the Note set 
the parameters of Airlift's obligation, it is the section 1110 
agreement that creates the binding contractual obligations 
of Airlift"). Therefore, cases in which the debtor did not 
enter into a S 1110 agreement do little to inform our 
analysis. 
 
TWA's argument that its obligation under the S 1110 
agreement ceased when it rejected the lease would stand on 
somewhat better ground if it had returned the aircraft 
immediately upon rejection, which it failed to do. 
Ultimately, however, even then its argument would fail 
because of the nature of the return condition obligation. 
 
As we held above, as long as the debtor retains the leased 
property without assuming the lease, it must meet its 
obligations coming due in accordance with the strictures of 
S 1110. Cf. In re Airlift, 761 F.2d at 1512 ("If the debtor 
wishes to stop the payment meter [under a S 1110 
agreement], he must return the aircraft . . . ."); 7 L. King, 
Collier on Bankruptcy P 1110.05[2][a] p. 1110-36 (15th ed. 
1997) ("if the obligation that the trustee agrees to perform 
under section 1110 is an obligation owing pursuant to a 
lease or executory contract, the trustee's agreement to 
perform should be enforceable until the time that the 
trustee formally rejects the lease or contract and 
surrenders possession"). 
 
If the lease obligations are not met, such failure 
constitutes a breach of the S 1110 agreement giving rise to 
an administrative claim. One of the lease obligations 
encompassed in the S 1110 agreement was the obligation 
under the lease to return the planes in a specified 
condition. Although the obligation fell due on a specific 
date, i.e., upon return, it accrued throughout the period of 
the lease which covered TWA's use of the airplanes during 
the course of its bankruptcy. It follows that when TWA 
returned the planes, they had to be in the condition 
required by the lease. See generally Kathryn Hoff-Patrinos, 
Aviation Finance Revisited: The 1994 Amendments to 
 
                                29 
  
Section 1110 of the Bankruptcy Code, 69 Am. Bankr. L. J. 
167, 199-200 & n. 144 (1995) (concluding that under a 
S 1110 agreement, a debtor's failure to meet maintenance 
and return conditions should be treated as an 
administrative expense). 
 
Thus, the return condition requirement arose while the 
S 1110 agreement was in effect and the district court did 
not err in holding that the damages flowing from TWA's 





TWA's final contention on its cross-appeal is that the 
district court erred in reversing the bankruptcy court's 
decision to offset the amount of Interface's damages 
resulting from TWA's failure to meet the lease's return 
maintenance requirements by the $1,478,000 security 
deposit that Interface held. 
 
Section 33 of the lease authorized Interface to withhold 
$1,478,000 that it owed to TWA and to retain that sum as 
a "maintenance deposit" to be returned to TWA without 
interest upon TWA's "completion of an OP-16 overhaul . . . 
on both Aircraft." App. at 708. Under TWA's FAA-approved 
maintenance program, each overhaul in a progression of 
increasingly more thorough or "heavier" maintenance 
overhauls must be performed after a specified number of 
flight hours. Under S 5(d) of the lease, if a plane, when 
returned to Interface, was more than 75% of the way to 
needing the next heaviest overhaul TWA was required to 
perform that overhaul, even if it would have otherwise been 
premature. 
 
It is undisputed that OP-16 overhauls would have cost 
TWA over $2,000,000 per plane. It is also undisputed that 
TWA never performed an OP-16 overhaul on either aircraft. 
TWA argues that it is entitled to a setoff in the amount of 
the deposit because an OP-16 overhaul never came due 
under TWA's FAA-approved maintenance plan. In response, 
Interface cites the plain language of S 33 and argues that 
because the OP-16 overhauls were never performed, it is 
entitled to retain the security deposit. 
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Without discussion, the bankruptcy court reduced the 
amount of Interface's award of damages for TWA's failure to 
meet the return conditions by the amount of the OP-16 
deposit. The district court reversed and concluded that, 
given the unambiguous language of S 33, Interface was 
entitled to retain the entire security deposit because TWA 
had not performed an OP-16 overhaul on either aircraft. 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 37. We agree. The $1,478,000 was not a 
general security deposit to protect Interface in the event 
that TWA failed to meet the return maintenance 
requirements. Rather, it was a specific deposit, tied only to 
the performance of the OP-16 overhauls. Whether Interface 
is entitled to retain the deposit is analytically distinct from 
and should have no bearing on Interface's recovery for 
TWA's failure to meet the various return conditions other 
than the performance of the OP-16 overhauls. 
 
Nothing on the face of S 33 suggests that Interface would 
have a duty to return the security deposit if TWA were to 
return the planes before the OP-16 overhauls were due. 
Thus, S 33 not only protected Interface in the event that 
TWA failed to perform OP-16 overhauls that were overdue, 
but shifted to TWA the risk of having to pay for the OP-16 
overhauls when due in the future. For example, in the 
absence of a lease provision such as S 33, if TWA returned 
the planes immediately before the OP-16 overhauls became 
due under S 5 of the lease, Interface would have been left to 
bear the entire cost of the overhauls. Section 33 assured 
Interface that, in the event of early termination, TWA would 
bear at least some responsibility for the cost of the 
overhauls. 
 
Because S 33 reflected a reasonable estimate, ex ante, of 
the injury that Interface would incur if TWA terminated the 
lease early, S 33 did not constitute an unenforceable 
penalty under New York law. See Pyramid Centres & Co., 
Ltd. v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 663 N.Y.S.2d 711, 713 (App. Div. 
1997) (stating that a liquidated damages clause is 
enforceable if it bears a reasonable proportion to the 
probable loss and if the amount of the actual loss is 
difficult to estimate). 
 
Under S 33, the return of the deposit was conditioned on 
TWA's performance of the OP-16 overhauls and that 
 
                                31 
  
condition was never satisfied. Accordingly, Interface is 
entitled to retain the deposit and the district court did not 
err in reversing the bankruptcy court's order setting off 




To conclude, on TWA's cross-appeal, we will (1) affirm the 
district court's denial of TWA's motion to dismiss Interface's 
unsecured claim as untimely filed, (2) affirm the district 
court's grant of administrative status to Interface's claim for 
damages flowing from TWA's failure to meet the return 
conditions, and (3) affirm the district court's decision that 
TWA was not entitled to offset the $1,478,000 maintenance 
security deposit held by Interface against Interface's 
recovery. 
 
We will remand this case to the district court for action 
in accordance with this opinion. Each party to bear its own 
costs. 
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